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Economics through the 
Lens of Psychology" by 
Sendhil Mullainathan 
COLIN F. CAMERER 
Sendhil Mullainathan'S paper does a terrific job of acquainting the reader with con-
cepts in behavioral economICS. Sendhil is one of the young wizards pioneering be-
havioral economics in nvo directions (which those of us working in behavioral eco-
nomics since the 1980s have been hoping would emerge for years)-formalizmg 
psychology mathematically in a way that makes it directly useful in economic theory, 
and searching for applications in field data (see Camerer and Loewenstein 2003 for 
a recent revIew). Sendhil has laid out the cemral questions clearly and thoroughly, so 
my discussion will focus on two topics that go beyond his essay: 
1. Other concepts in psychology that can be used to think about development, par-
ticularly attribution theory and mental modeling. 
2. The prospect for simple experiments that can tell us something about develop-
ment, illustrated with two examples : a remarkable cross-cultural coordinated field 
experiment, and a laboratory experiment on simple capital Investment economies 
with poverty traps. 
New Psychology and "21 st-Century Behavioral Economics" 
Sendhil's paper covers what might be called "20th-century behaVioral economics." 
That is, most of these ideas developed during the 1980s, when psychologists like 
Kahneman and Tversky used the rational choice model as a foil against which to 
understand limits on rationality; Kahneman shared the Nobel Prize with Vernon 
Smith in 2002. Their idea was to use deviations from rational principles such as 
utility-maximization and Bayesian updating, much as optical illusions are used to 
study perception: The deviations from rationality tell us about the basic mechanisms 
of judgment and choice . 
Of the concepts Sendhil describes, a particularly important one for development is 
"loss-aversion"-the fact that losses loom larger than equal-sized gains (and probably 
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activate different regions of the brain}. An implication of this principle is that people 
really dislike giving up what they have gonen used to having or expenencing. This 
makes it difficult ro implement reforms. At lunch with Vernon Smith after this sympo-
sium, Vernon mentioned that in implementing economIC des1gn (a practice pioneered 
by him and my Cahech colleague Charles Plott, among others), it is crucial to "grand-
father" rules so that people with current entitlements won't fear having them taken 
away. This dictum is the economic engineer's way of incorporating aW3reness of loss-
aversion to craft reforms that can be implemented from a behavioral point of view. 
The fact that the psychologists who laid the groundwork for 20th-century behav-
ioral economICs focused on deviations from simple rationality principles constrained 
the kinds of psychology that they tapped-and that we imported 10[0 economics. 
This leaves a lot of other interesting ideas in psychology. I'll discuss m 'o of these: 
attribution and mental modeling. 
Attribution of Credit and Blame 
In most complex systems, we really don't know who is at fault. Psychologists call the 
problem of determining cause and effect, and credit and blame, "attribution theory." 
Attribution is important because, if we think oil prices are high because oil sheikhs 
and OPEC are conspiring, that may lead to one political decision. If, however, we 
think an incumbent president is [0 blame, that leads to a different decision. 
AnO[her important feature of attribution is that there's lots of scope to disagree 
about who [0 blame. Often twO groups "self-servingly" blame each other, and there 
may nO[ be clear evidence that can establish who should be blamed (absent formal 
institutions such as court proceedings). A good example is economic sanctions and 
embargoes against countries whose policies we disagree with . It is fair to say that 
sanctions have not always worked well (the fact that they are often 10 place for so 
long might be taken as evidence of failure ). Self-serving attribution of credit and 
blame might help explain why, for example, from an American point of view it seems 
obvious that the Cubans should blame Castro for the economic loss from American 
sanctions and push to overthrow him or demand reform that would end the sanc-
tions. But the Cubans may see it differently-they may blame the Americans, which 
could actually Increase Cuban support for Castro. (Being threatened by an outside 
force often brings people together, a phenomenon called the "common enemy effect" 
in social psychology. I) Of course, I am not taking a stand on who is really to blame. 
In fact, that's the key poim: Because it is difficult to assign blame (the way the legal 
proceedings may in a negligence case), there is room for disagreement that is self-
serving. The disagreement means that the sanctions will not work as well as hoped 
by those who imposed them. 
Mental Models 
In developing economies a cognitive scientist would study the mental models that 
participants in .the economy have of what's going on, a point stressed by Douglass 
North (1994 ). A mental model is the intuitive set of principles or ideas of how things 
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work, which governs people's predictions about the efiects at change. These mental 
models are oversimplified, and often illogical or physically incorrect. For example. 
before special training in physics, people often have ideas ahom physical sysrems that 
are flat wrong, but IOtuitive (,\JkCloskey 1983). If you ask people what happens to a 
ball you are twirling on a string in a ci rcu lar motion, when the string breaks, many of 
them tell you the ball will conti nue to arc in a circle away from the broken srring-
because the velocity of the ball contains "momentum," which includes the ci rcul arity 
from its previous motion. Of course, we now know that this mental model is wrong. 
When the string breaks, the ball heads off in a straight line tangent to the imagina ry 
perpendicular line berween the center of the circular orbit and the ball's position when 
the string broke. We know the "circular momentum" theory is wrong, bur it was an 
accepted model in physics umil about 1500, before the Newtonian revolurion. 
So it may well be [hat people in simple economies (or even current theorists !) have 
oversimplified mental models of political economy that are illogical or empirically 
incorrect. Yet these mental models often guide voting and protest and, as nored above, 
attriburions of credit or blame. Incorrect mental models are especially import3m in 
dynamic systems where the lag time for policies to yield good results is unknown. This 
point has been clearly established by John Sterman and colleagues (Sterman 2002 ). 
Sterman illustrates his point with the problem of gen ing a hot shower in a hotel you 
JUSt checked into but have not visited before. You turn on the hot water. If it takes a 
little while to turn hot, you turn it honer, wait a little longer, then turn it even hOlier. 
A minute later you step in and are soon blasted by scalding hot water. 
The mistake the hapless shower-taker makes is underestimating the amount of hOI 
water in Ihe invisible supply line. You can easi ly imagine how, in implementing polit-
ical reforms where it's difficult to promise people when good things will happen, that 
a misunderstanding of dynamics could be important in caus ing political impatience. 
It is well documented that educat ion is important for economic growth. Literacy, 
awareness of scientific principles, and marketable human capital are obviously 
important parts of why education is good for economic growth. But another part of 
the value of education ma y be that it supplies people with better mental models and 
shines light on logical inconsistencies in their beliefs. Education generates a sense of 
who you can trust, whether you can IrUSt what you read in the paper, and so on, 
which may in turn disarm naive beliefs, repair people's fault), mental models of polit-
ical economy, and enable good reforms. 
Experiments about Development, and during Development 
Experiments have been crucial in advancing behavioral economics. I'll discuss twO 
directions that may be relevant for development. 
Experiments about Development 
To an outsider, a striking fact about economic research on growth is the limited 
dialogue between theorists-those who do statistical analyses (cross-country growth 
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regressions)-and policymakers with a lot of field experience. Experiments may help 
bridge this gap by providing evidence from simple artificial domains that correspond 
to the artificial worlds of simple theory, since experiments can always be enriched to 
include features policy analysts and statistica l analysis suggest are imporram. 
Capra and others (2004 ) have been conducting simple experiments on econom ies 
with capital Investment and "poverry traps." In these expenments subjects choose 
levels of capital Investment. Investment produces goods that produce utility. There is 
a critical mass of investment that boosts productivity, and all the subjects know this. 
The critical mass means there are two steady-state equilibria: one in which people 
invest below the critical thteshold and produce and consume less (a technological 
poverty trap); and another In whlCh investment is high. the threshold is crossed so 
that productivity is boosted. and people consume more and have higher utiliry (which 
In turn translates rnto higher actual money earnings from the experimenr ). Figure 1 
(left graph ) shows what happens in a typical baseline session. The y-axis shows 
utilities from consumption U(C)- the twO equilibrium levels are the horizontal lines 
at 6 (poverty trap ) and 18 (efficiency) over many periods of time in the experiment 
(x-axis ). There IS some movement up and down, but results basically get stuck near 
the poverty-trap equilibrium where U(C) = 6. 
The middle panel in figure 1 shows what happens when people are allowed to 
propose capital allocation schemes and vote on them (the votes ate binding ). This 
FIGURE 1. 
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portrays an economy in which the International Monetary Fund or some other coor-
dinating agency (or a national indumial policy ) requires certain levels of im·estment. 
As shown in this figure, voting often lifts investment up closer to the utility-
maximizing level of 18, but votes usually do nOt stick for long and the experimental 
economy is often drawn down into the poverty trap result of U(q = 6. 
The right panel shows what happens when subjects are allowed [Q freel~' commu-
nicate using an instant messaging system. As with voting, allowing subjects [Q talk 
helps them agree to invest more (i n the later stages), but only temporari ly. 
The message of these experiments is that even when high investment is better for 
everyone (Pareto-improving, in economic jargon), and when subjects can talk about 
the fact that everyone benefits from a produClivity boost when tOtal investment is 
high enough, it is hard to reach the beSt equilibrium and make it stick. Of course, 
these are simple experiments. But if it is difficult for a small number of college stu-
dents to reach the good equilibria in these simple domains, one can't help bur won-
der how a much more complex economy can do so. More importantly, criticisms of 
the external validity of the experiment can readily be translated into designs for new, 
richer, experiments and predictions about what would happen if the experiment were 
changed (played for more money, for more time, or played by actual firms or agency 
regulators). The point is that the experiments are a platform onto which complica-
tions can easily be added. 
Experiments on Social Capital during Development 
Another kind of experiment that is ca tching fire IS the idea of "packing your labora-
tory" and conducting controlled experiments in developing countries. There you can 
study the people whose behavior you want to eventually effect, in domains that are 
familiar to the subjects (as in Harrison and List, currently in press, and in Karla 
Hoff's companion discussion to mine, in this volume). 
One dramatic field experiment project is a unique collaboration by a dozen 
anthropologists in 15 small-scale societies, mostly in Africa and the Amazon basin. 
These are all extremely small-sca le societies, typically barter economies with little 
political structure and some degree of market exchange (such as selling extra crops 
or cows at market once a week). The anthropologists were interested because these 
are some of the last places on Earth that resemble hunter-gatherer economies from 
100,000 years ago, and in which we think the human brain may have evolved. 
The anthropologists in this field experiment conducted a series of simple games. 
I'll describe only one, an "ultimatum" or take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game. One 
person is given a sum of money, say $10 (usuall y a sum with large local purchasing 
power, worth several days' wages, so subjects are highly motivated). Then the anthro-
pologists offer a fraction of the SIO to another subject (a stranger) in private. If the 
" responder" subject accepts the offer, both subjects earn the amounts of money 
agreed upon. If the responder says "No," the offer is rejected and they get nothing. 
The game is a simple way of measuring norms of sharing, and whether people 
express "negative. reciprocity'" by rejecting offers they perceive as unfair. In many 
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FIGURE 2. 
Mean Ultimatum Offers and Market Integration and Cooperation 
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experiments people typically offer a little less than half, and offers of less than $2 are 
rejected about half the time (see Camerer 2003, chapter 2). 
Figure 2 shows the average ultimatum offer in each society on the y-axes. The 
x-axes represent how the societies rank, from high to low, in terms of market inte-
gration (roughly the amount of their consumption that comes from market-
exchanged goods, the tOp graph) and the social payoff to cooperation (e.g., whether 
they build schools and plow fields tOgether, the bottom graph). The numbers are 
rescaled so that zero is not a zero offer but is the mean across the groups (around 
40 percent, which is rypicai of Western college students and others). 
Ironically, in some of these groups you see something close to the subgame perfect 
prediction of game theory, which is that people who care only about getting the most 
money should accept very little, and the person making the offer should anticipate this 
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and offer vcry li ttle. Among the Machiguenga in Peru, and the Quicha in Ecuador, the 
subgame perfect self-interest pred iction of low offers is a good approximation. The 
Machigucnga arc highly asocial (they have no proper names to refer to people other 
than their kin ). They don't seem to think a stranger should share with them: and they 
don't get upset when they arc offered vcry little (only onc offer was rej ected). Thus, 
rhe anthropologists found some places where ga me theory is alive and well; in remote 
villages in SOUIh America. 
The key point of figure 2 is the positive correlation between ultimatum offers and 
the degrees of market integration and cooperation. A na"lve reading of economist 
Adam Smith (in The \Vealtl, of Nations) is that self-i nt erest is sufficient to produce 
marker allocat ions, because " It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer 
or the baker that we expect our dinner, bu t from their regard to their own interest:' 
This is sometimes interpreted to mean tha t Smith thought a sense of fairness or jus-
tice had norhing 10 do with effective operation of markets. But in hi s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments Smith uses the phrase " invisible hand" quite differently. Here he 
says the wealthy "are led by an invisihle hal/d to make nearly the same distri bution 
of the necessities of life which would have been made had the ea rth been divided into 
equal portions among all inhabitants. " (see Ashraf and others 2004) 
Thus, Smith hints that even in marker allocations either an implicit or explicit 
sense of fa irness plays a role. The cross-cultural experiments show that fair sharing 
is correlated with participation in markets across some societies, nor antithetica l to 
it. Of course, we do not know the direction of ca usality. Fair sharing of surplus might 
enable markets to flourish, or tradIng with Strangers might inculcate a sense of sym-
pathy and fairness. In any case, these experiments show how something central to 
development-a concept of social capital in the form of widely shared norms of 
surplus-sharing-can be understood with experimental data in a fresh way. 
Note 
1. A Ma y 2004 Los Allgeles Times article reponed that coalition forces were surprised at how 
much the ohen-divisive Sunni and Shiite Muslims had banded together agalllst coalition 
forces. The art icle reported a Mcommon saying in Iraq M that encapsulates the common 
enemy effect: MMe and my brother against my cousin. Me and my cousin againsl the 
stranger ... 
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